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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN C. SITTNER
Plaintiff/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
AND JOY HALE

vs,
Case No. 971759-CA
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE OF
THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER FAMILY
TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA, SHIRLYNN
GILDEA, AND JOY HALE.

(Priority No. 15)

Defendant/Appellees
Appeal from Summary Judgment of Dismissal and
Award of Attorneys Fees in Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Judge Homer Wilkinson, Presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellees object to Appellant's characterizations made as a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE and offer the following for clarification.
A.

Nature Of The Case.

In February of 1981 appellee/defendant Joy Hale sold a house
and lot under a title retaining contract to appellees/defendants
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea. The referenced property has since been
the residence of the GiIdeas. [Contract, Rec. 1109-1111]
On November 25, 1985 plaintiff/appellant

John C. Sittner

obtained judgment against Bruce Gildea and others, (not including
appellee Shirlynn Gildea) in the amount of $30,598.35 plus
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attorney's fees of $3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per
annum.

Attorney L. Benson Mabey acted as Mr. Sittner!s attorney.

See, Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Civil No. C-82-4804,
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah.

[Judgment, Rec.

1112,1113]
Sittner and Mabey sought to attach and sell Bruce GiIdea's
vendee interest in the residence to satisfy their judgment.

On

January 16, 1986 Bruce Gildea, filed for protection under Chapter
11 of the bankruptcy code voiding Sittnerfs execution efforts.

On

August 31, 1987 the Chapter 11 filing was converted to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
Appellant Sittner and attorney Mabey filed a Proof of Claim
with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured creditors
citing the Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil judgment.

[Proof of

Claim, Rec. 1114].
The Sittner judgment fell within the 90 day preferential
transfer period proscribed in 11 U.S.C. § 547.

Bankruptcy

Trustee, Duane H. Gillman, filed an Adversarial Complaint, under
Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid Sittnerfs judgment
lien. [Adversarial Complaint, Rec. 1115-1118]
The adversarial action was resolved by stipulation wherein
appellant Sittner agreed to the following terms:
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to
assert a secured claim in and to any property of this
estate or any funds which constitute proceeds of property
of this estate and acknowledges that any and all claim he
has is an unsecured, pre-petition claim.
Defendant's
rights respecting property abandoned by the estate or not
- 2 -

administered by closing are preserved and unaffected hereby."
[Stipulation, Rec. 1119,1120]
Sittner and his attorney, L. Benson Mabey, thereupon secured
payment of $4,032.99 as their share of distribution to unsecured
creditors on their claim of $36,228.73 against Bruce Gildea.
[Payment check, Rec. 1121].
On December 14, 1987, Judge Allen entered a DISCHARGE OF
DEBTOR Order absolving Bruce Gildea of all of his debt. [Discharge
of Debtor, Rec. 1122].
On February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to vendor Joy Hale and the
subject residence leaving Mrs. Hale free to foreclose or otherwise
dispose of the property.

The subject real estate contract was

seriously in default and amortizing negatively and there was no
equity in the property.

[Order Vacating Stay, Rec. 1113]

Although free of the Automatic Stay in February of 1988,
Sittner brought no adversary proceeding seeking to value the
subject real estate contract.

At no time did he challenge Mrs.

Hale's title nor assert a judgement lien interest in the property
while the matter was in the Bankruptcy Court.
In August of 1992, appellee Joy Hale sold her interest in the
subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to appellee Karen H. Schriever
for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for cash.
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B.

Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition.

Upon learning of Schriever's purchase of the property, Sittner
and Mabey filed this action against, Schriever, Hale, and the
GiIdeas. The Complaint alleges that since Schriever is "related by
blood or marriage to either Bruce Gildea or Shirlynn Gildea" the
conveyance of the property to the Karen H. Schriever Family Trust
"was for the benefit of the GiIdeas" and the conveyance from Hale
to Schriever "constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements
under the "Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. §
26-6-1 et seq."
Sittnerfs complaint further alleged that the Warranty Deed
from Hale to Schriever was issued "with actual intent to hinder,
delay or defeat" the judgment lien claimed by appellant Sittner and
asked the trial court to "impress" the subject realty with a
judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting first lien against a onehalf undivided interest in the subject property" and to have the
subject property sold at execution sale to satisfy Sittner!s
Judgment." [Complaint, Rec. 6,7,8]
By affidavit, Sittner asserted the

"judgment lien" had an

"unpaid balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate
of 20% per annum.

[Sittner Affidavit, Rec. 130-134].

Nowhere in

the pleadings did Sittner acknowledge that his judgment had been
fully discharged in Bruce Gildea1s bankruptcy action.
Appellees Schriever answered Sittner!s complaint asserting in
part that "Plaintifffs Complaint is without merit and in bad faith"
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and included a prayer for relief of dismissal and attorney's fees.
[Answer, Rec. 37].
In March of 1994, appellee Karen H. Schriever moved for
Summary Judgment asserting: (1) Sittnerfs judgment against Gildea
had

been

satisfied

and

the

lien

avoided

in Bruce

Gildea1s

bankruptcy; (2) Appellant failed to state a cause of action under
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Statute; and (3) the eight (8) year
statutory period for foreclosing a judgment lien expired November
24, 1993 eight years after entry of the judgment. Plaintiff filed
a counter Motion For Summary Judgment.
On May 18, 1994 the trial court entered judgment dismissing
the action.

However, on September 7th, 1994 the court vacated its

order of dismissal reinstating Plaintiff's Complaint.

The Court

found that Appellant's judgment lien had somehow survived Bruce
Gildea1s bankruptcy action.

The Court specifically declined to

rule on other issues including Sittner's failure to state a cause
of action under the Fraudulent Transfer Statute and whether the
judgment lien had expired eight years after the date of judgment as
provided in Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1.
On March 10, 1995 Sittner resumed prosecution of this action
by

filing

a

"Motion For

Partial

Summary

Judgment

to Permit

Execution Proceedings to be Completed." [Rec. 469-470].
On March 24, 1995 appellee Schriever filed her second Motion
For Summary Judgment alleging substantially the same defenses
asserted in her first Motion. [Rec. 510].
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Appellee Bruce Gildea petitioned the bankruptcy court and on
May 8, 1995, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen granted his motion
to reopen GiIdea's 1986 bankruptcy.

On June 13, 1995, Judge Allen

entered an Order which states in part:
Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy was discharged December 14,
1987, and that discharge enjoined all creditors and other
parties from attempting to collect any debt that has been
discharged.
The action of John C. Sittner of suing in
state court was a violation of the injunction, which is
still in effect, and sanctions are appropriate against
both John C. Sittner and his counsel L. Benson Mabey, for
violation of the continuing injunction, in the amount of
Eight
Thousand
Dollars
($8,000.00),
jointly
and
severally. [Order, Rec. 1096,1097, Addendum 4]
On October 10, 1995, Sittner and Mabey obtained an order from
Judge Wilkinson, staying further proceedings in this action pending
the outcome of Sittnerfs and Mabey's appeal of Judge Allen's Order
to the U.S. District Court for the State of Utah.

On July 16,

1996, U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell ruled the Third District
Court is competent to make a ruling on the dischargeability issue
and reversed Judge Allen's order reopening Mr. GiIdea's bankruptcy.
Judge Tena Campbell's ruling includes the following specific
finding:
!,

The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation
of the status of Sittner's judgment lien is correct in
all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was
waived in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and the
debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in
bankruptcy". [Order, Rec. 1106, Addendum 5 ] .
On October 23, 1996, more than eight years and eight months
after the Automatic Stay had been lifted by the bankruptcy court
allowing Mrs. Hale to sell or foreclose her security interest in
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the subject property Sittner resumed efforts to foreclose his
claimed judgment lien by filing a Motion For An Order Compelling
Discovery.

He asked the trial court to allow him to take the

depositions of appellees Hale

(then on

an LDS Mission) and

Schriever (a resident of Maryland) by telephone. [Rec. 946].
Thereafter, on January 14, 1997 appellee Schriever filed her
Third Motion For Summary Judgment. [Rec. 1061].
On March 25, 1997, Judge Wilkinson granted Schriever's Third
Motion

For

Summary

Judgment

dismissing

complaint with prejudice and awarding all

appellant

Sittner's

appellee/defendants

costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code annotated 78-27-56.
[Rec. 1257, Copy, Addendum 1],
The trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
detailing basis for its conclusion that "Plaintiff's claims are
without merit and not asserted in good faith".

[Rec. 1250-1255,

Copy, Addendum 2].
Neither the Judgment nor the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were contested by Appellant.

No motion was filed pursuant

to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Appellees/defendants

submitted

itemized

statements

attorneys fees incurred in defending this action.

of

Appellant

objected to the fees and the matter was set for hearing on June 11,
1997.

The trial court asked the parties to try to reach an

agreement without further litigation, expense and delay.
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The

parties compromised their claims and entered into the record the
terms of a stipulation wherein appellee Karen H. Schriever was to
be awarded $17,500.00; appellees Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea were to
be awarded $16,000,00; and appellee Joy Hale was to be awarded
$3,750.00. [Transcript of Proceedings, Rec. 1496-1499].
On June 27, 1997 the trial court entered a "Supplemental
Judgment for Award of Attorney's Fees" awarding appellee Schriever
$17,500.00;

appellees

Gildea

$16,000.00;

and

appellee

$3,750.00 pursuant to stipulation of all parties.

Hale

[Supplemental

Judgment, Rec. 1400-1401]
On

July

25,

1997,

Appellant

sought

relief

from

the

Supplemental Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and (7), Utah R.
Civ. P. [Rec. 1412-1413].
On September 29, 1997, the trial court entered an
Order pursuant to Appellant's Rule 60(b)(3) and (7) motion stating:
"...the supplemental judgment for attorney's fees signed
and entered June 27, 1997 is vacated pending further
consideration by the Court of Plaintiff's motion to
vacate the stipulation, et. al, but reserving the right
to re-instate the supplemental judgment as previously
signed and entered, should the Court determine after
further consideration that Plaintiff's motion is not well
taken and should be denied." [Order, Rec. 1533-1535].
On October 21, 1997 the trial court entered a second
Supplemental Judgment Awarding Attorney's fees.

The judgment was

prepared by Appellant's counsel and restated the terms of the
previous judgment.

[Supplemental Judgment Awarding Attorney's

Fees, Rec. 1541-1542].
No motion was filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b),
- 8-

54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

Appellate Proceedings and Disposition.

On November 14, 1997, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of
the "final judgment" entered October 21, 1997.
On July 9, 1998 this Court granted appellee Schriever?s motion
for summary disposition dismissing Appellant's appeal for failure
to file a timely appeal.

The court cited both Taylor v. Hansen,

342 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, (Utah Ct. App.1998) and Lord v. Lord, 709
P.2d 338 (Utah 1985) as precedent. Appellant filed a Petition For
Rehearing and appellee Schriever filed a response.

On September

30, 1998, this Court entered an order denying the Petition For
Rehearing. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion For Reinstatement
of Appeal.

This Court granted appellee Schrieverfs

Motion to

Strike Appellant's Motion For Reinstatement of Appeal holding it to
be a successive Petition For Rehearing.
Appellant's petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court
was granted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and remanded this case back for a review of the merits
of Appellant's appeal.
D.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.

Appellant's characterizations made as a Statement of Facts are
incomplete and intentionally misleading.
His representations in paragraphs 9 and 11, p. 10 of his brief
are particularly disingenuous.

In paragraph 9, Attorney Mabey
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states:
9. In December of 1991, Sittner received a check from the
bankruptcy trustee for $4,033 representing a distribution
on Sittner's unsecured claim of $36,228 [Rec. 1072 at 1F9,
Rec.1121]. After Sittner applied the distribution to the
judgment debt, there still remained a balance owed in
excess of $30,000 [Sittner Aff. ir5, Rec. 130, 131] .
Nowhere in the Statement of facts does attorney Mabey disclose
that on December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order releasing appellee Bruce Gildea
from all personal liability for debts existing on the date of
commencement of his bankruptcy.
Appellant's

assertion

that

after

Sittner

applied

the

distribution to the judgment debt, there still remained a balance
owed in excess of $30,000 is totally disingenuous and certainly not
an undisputed fact as Mabey represents. There is no issue of fact.
Sittner!s
bankruptcy.

judgment

debt

was

fully

discharged

in

GiIdea's

See Bankruptcy Trustee Duane H. Gillman affidavit

[Rec.93,94] stating:
4. Mr. Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey,
entered into a stipulation with me as Trustee, wherein
Mr. Sittner waived "...any right to assert a secured
claim in and to any property of this estate or any funds
which constitute proceeds of property of this estate and
acknowledges that any and all claim he has is an
unsecured pre-petition claim."
5. Mr. Sittner was thereafter paid $4,032.99 as his
proportionate share of the debtor's estate. Mr. Gildea
was fully discharged of any further liability under Mr.
Sittner' s claim.
Attorney Mabey was not finished attempting to manufacture
facts more to his liking.

In paragraph 11, page 10 of his Brief
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Mr. Mabey blandly asserts:
11. The subject property was not sold by the trustee or
otherwise administered for the benefit of the estate,
since the trustee had determined that there was not
sufficient equity available to benefit the estate and he
intended to abandon the property, but no formal order of
abandonment was made or entered and so it was deemed
abandoned to Gildea upon bankruptcy case closing on April
24, 1992.
Appellant fails to disclose that the subject property was not
in fact abandoned to Gildea on April 24, 1992 as he so "deemed."
Four years and two months earlier, on February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy
Judge John H. Allen issued an order vacating the Automatic Stay as
to secured creditor Joy Horsley (Hale) and the subject property
leaving Mrs. Hale free to foreclose her security interest without
further order of the court. [Rec. 1113].
ARGUMENT
Point I
A.

APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT LIEN.
Sittner's Judgment Lien And Claim Of A Secured Interest
In Bruce GiIdea's Bankruptcy Estate Was Waived During
The Course Of Bruce Gildea1s Bankruptcy.

From the facts of record Judge Wilkinson's Conclusion of Law
that "Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce GiIdea's
estate was waived during the course of Bruce GiIdea's bankruptcy"
is inescapable.

Sittner signed a stipulation with the bankruptcy

court stating that he "waives any right to assert a secured claim
in and to any property of this estate or any funds which constitute
proceeds of property of this estate and acknowledges that any and
- 11 -

all claim he has is an unsecured, pre-petition claim." [Rec.
1119,1120]
Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey, filed a PROOF
OF CLAIM with the United States Bankruptcy Court listing himself as
an unsecured creditor of Bruce Gildea. [Rec. 1114].

Sittner

received payment of $4,032.99 as his share of distribution to
unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73 against appellee
Gildea. [Rec. 1121]
The issue of Sittner's waiver of his judgment
litigated

lien was

in the Bankruptcy and U.S. District Court and the

opinions of Bankruptcy Judge John Allen and U.S. District Court
Judge Tena Campbell should preclude further litigation of the
matter

under

Preclusion."

the

doctrine

of

"Collateral

Estoppel/Issue

When the facts of this case were submitted to the

bankruptcy court, Judge John H. Allen reopened Bruce Gildea*s
bankruptcy case and granted Bruce Gildea1s Motion for Sanctions
against

L. Benson Mabey and John C. Sittner for bringing this

action.

Judge Allen's bench ruling, [Addendum 3] states in part:

Thus, my conclusion is that the actions of Mr. Sittner in
this case in filing the proof of claim as an unsecured
claim, participating in all respects as an unsecured
creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured
creditor with a pre-petition claim had the effect of
waiving that judgment lien. [Transcript Rec. 1092]
And the action of bringing an action in the state court
to set aside a conveyance to other parties and to
foreclose the lien that had been waived is an action in
violation of the discharge injunction.
There was no
lien. There was no basis whatsoever for filing the suit
in the state court. [Rec. 1093].
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I find therefore, that Mr. Sittner waived the lien.
There was no lien after the discharge.
The action of
suing in the state court was a violation of the
injunction.
Sanctions are appropriate against Mr.
Sittner and counsel Mr. Mabey, who participated in all
respects in the bankruptcy proceeding and had all the
knowledge, in fact more knowledge probably than Mr.
Sittner. [Rec. 1093].
On July 16, 1996, U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell ruled the
Third

District

Court

is competent

to make

a ruling

on the

dischargeability issue and reversed Judge Allen's order reopening
Mr. Gildea's bankruptcy.

However, as part of her decision Judge

Campbell ruled:
"The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation
of the status of Sittner1s judgment lien is correct in
all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was
waived in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and the
debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in
bankruptcy". [Order, Rec. 1106, Addendum 5].
Judge Campbell's decision was never modified and should be the
final authority on the matter.

Appellant's claim that "The Trial

Judge Abused His Discretion In Not Granting Sittner's Motion to
Strike Other Judges' Opinions And In Considering Such Opinions In
Granting

Defendants'

Summary

Judgment"

is

hollow

indeed.

Appellant, himself, used Judge Allen's opinion to obtain a stay of
proceedings in this case to appeal Judge Allen's decision to the
U.S. District Court.
The fact that Judge Campbell's opinion is unpublished does not
preclude its use for precedential value in this case.

Rule 4-508,

Code of Judicial Administration specifically authorizes the use of
unpublished orders "for purposes of applying the doctrine of the
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law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel."
B.

A Discharge Of Debt In Bankruptcy Extinguishes
The Judgment Lien.

When a judgment debt is satisfied the judgment
extinguished.

lien is

Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1 provides that "Judgments

shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is previously
satisfied."
Bruce Gildea*s bankruptcy fully discharged the judgment debt
asserted by Appellant as the basis for this action, Appellant!s bad
faith contentions notwithstanding.

By Affidavit [Rec. 130-134]

Sittner asserts that the unpaid balance of the judgment lien after
crediting all amounts received including the amount received from
the bankruptcy estate of Bruce Gildea is $90,197.40 together with
interest accruing at the rate of 20% per annum.
Judgment liens don!t have unpaid balances.

A judgment lien

is only a means for collecting a valid judgment debt.
"A judgment lien on land constitutes no property or
property right in the land itself.
It confers only a
right to levy on the same to the exclusion of other
adverse interests subsequent to the judgment". Smith v,
Schwartz, 60 P.305, 309 (Utah 1899)
In Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988), the
High Court ruled that Utah's "statutory scheme has no provision for
the extension of a judgment lien independent of the judgement on
which it is based".

The Court in concluding that a discharge of

judgment in bankruptcy precludes enforcement of a judgment lien
even if the judgment lien was not avoided in bankruptcy stated as
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follows:
[1] Appellant contends that since the judgment lien was
not avoided in bankruptcy proceeding, it is renewable and
the judgment should be renewed in some limited form to
support the lien without reviving respondents' personal
liability.
This theory finds no support in our
statutory scheme. A judgment lien is purely a creation
of statute. It does not exist in common law; therefore,
the rights of the parties must be determined within the
statutory framework.
Accordingly, Sittner's judgment lien was voided when appellee
Bruce Gildea obtained a discharge of indebtedness from the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the State of Utah on December 14, 1987.

C.

Appellant Is Estopped To Assert A Judgment Lien.

Appellant Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey, filed
a PROOF OF CLAIM with the United States Bankruptcy Court listing
himself as an unsecured creditor of appellee Bruce Gildea.
Sittner received payment of $4,032.99 as his share of distribution
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73 against appellee
Gildea.

In order to participate as an unsecured creditor Sittner

entered into a Stipulation with Trustee Gillman as follows:
"1. ... John C. Sittner, waives any right to assert a
secured claim in and to any property of this estate or
any funds which constitute proceeds of property of this
estate and acknowledges that any and all claim he has is
an unsecured, pre-petition claim." [Rec.1119].
The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel bars a litigant who has
taken a position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on the
basis of that position from maintaining the opposite position in a
subsequent action. See Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah

- 15 -

1980) and Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551
P.2d

1259

(Utah 1976).

A party

is bound by his judicial

declarations and may not contradict them in a subsequent proceeding
involving the same parties and issues.

See Sailes v.Jones, 499

P.2d 721 and Adams v. Bear, 350 P.2d 751.
Plaintiff Sittner is estopped by his prior actions.
have it both ways.

He can't

He can't waive any right he may have to assert

a secured claim in the bankruptcy court in order to receive payment
as an unsecured creditor and thereafter assert that he is a secured
creditor in the state courts and that his judgment lien was not
avoided by the bankruptcy proceeding initiated for the very purpose
of avoiding his lien.
D.

The Statutory Period For Foreclosing Sittner!s
Judgment Lien Expired, Notwithstanding Any Tolling
Period That Could Have Been Caused By Bruce GiIdea's
Bankruptcy.

Even if the claimed judgment lien had somehow survived lien
waiver and satisfaction of judgment

in the bankruptcy court,

enforcement of the lien was barred by expiration of the limitation
period for enforcing judgment liens.

Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1(1)

provides:
Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously
satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in
accordance with law.
Sittnerfs judgement was docketed November 25, 1985 and would
expire November 25, 1993 unless "enforcement of the judgment is
stayed in accordance with law."

Appellant argues that under the
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Bankruptcy Code §108(c), the limitation period was suspended for
more than six years by the automatic stay and such period is tacked
on to the normal expiration date in November of 1993.

Mabey

asserts that Sittner's judgment was enforceable until the end of
1999 by operation of the federal law.
Mabey fails to inform the court that the automatic stay was
not in effect until April 24, 1992 as he represents to this court.
On February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued an
order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property leaving Mrs. Hale free to
foreclose her security interest without further order of the court.
[Rec. 1113].
Factoring the truth into the equation, it can only be said
that the automatic stay was in effect from January 16, 1986 when
Gildea!s bankruptcy was filed until February 19, 1988 when the stay
was lifted, a period of two years and 33 days.

If one adds two

years and thirty three days to November 25, 1993 the expiration
date for enforcing the lien would be extended to December 28, 1995.
This court should bear in mind that Appellant was under a self
imposed stay of proceedings on December 28, 1995. On October 10,
1995 Sittner sought and obtained an order from Judge Wilkinson
staying further proceedings in this case pending review of the
bankruptcy order by the U.S. District Court. [Rec. 939-941].
On October 23, 1996, more than eight years and eight months
after the Automatic Stay had been lifted by the bankruptcy court,
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Sittner resumed efforts to foreclose his claimed judgment lien by
filing a Motion For An Order Compelling Discovery.

He asked the

court to allow him to take the depositions of appellees Hale (then
on an LDS Mission) and Schriever (a resident of Maryland) by
telephone. [Rec. 946].
Thereafter, on January 14, 1997 appellee Schriever filed her
Third Motion For Summary Judgment. [Rec. 1061].

On

March

25,

1997, Judge Wilkinson granted Schriever's Third Motion For Summary
Judgment dismissing appellant Sittnerfs complaint with prejudice
and awarding all appellee/defendants
pursuant

to Utah Code annotated

costs and attorneys fees

78-27-56.

[Rec. 1257, Copy,

Addendum 1].
Even if this Court accepts Appellant's argument that the eight
year limitation for foreclosing a lien should be extended by the
time the property was shielded by the automatic stay it is of no
benefit to Appellant.

The trial court's entry of Summary Judgment

dismissing Appellant's action did not occur until fifteen months
after the two year and 33 day extension would have expired.
In Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P.305, (Utah 1899) the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the lien of a judgment expires at the end of the
statutory period established by the legislature and the courts are
powerless to extend it beyond that time - even though the judgment
creditor was wrongfully enjoined from levying execution upon the
property until after his lien expired.
It matters not that Plaintiff Sittner!s alleged lien expired
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during the pendency of this action. In Federal Farm Mortgage Corp.
v. Walker, 115 Utah 461, 206 P.2d 146 (Utah 1949) the trial court's
entry of a judgment foreclosing a lien which had expired during the
pendency of the foreclosure action was reversed citing Smith v.
Schwartz.
Point II

APPELLANT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE
UTAH UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT.

A.

There Was No Transfer Of GiIdea's Interest.

Upon purchase of the vendor's
property

appellee

Schriever

assumed

contract seller to the GiIdeas.

interest

in the subject

Mrs. Hale's

position as

The transaction involved no

conveyance or modification of Mr. Gildea's interest in the subject
property.

The Gildeas retain a vendees' interest under the

installment purchase contract and continue to occupy the subject
property as their family residence.
Appellant, asserts that appellee Joy Hale's sale of her
vendor's interest in an installment land contract to appellee
Schriever "constituted fraudulent transfers . . . under the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq."
Plaintiff's

complaint

cites no specifics

in support of this

allegation other than to note that appellee Schriever is appellee
Shirlynn GiIdea's sister and to allege that appellee Bruce Gildea
"directed" appellee Hale to transfer the property to appellee
Schriever.

Assuming all of Appellant's allegations to be true.

Appellant's complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which
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relief may be granted.
Appellant fails to note which section of the Utah Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act he relies upon.

Utah Code Ann. 25-6-5

and 25-6-6 appear to be the operative provisions of the act but
each require a "debtor" and a "creditor" and a "transfer"

by a

"debtor" with the "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a
creditor of the debtor" or a transfer made "without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange" when the "debtor was
insolvent at the time" or rendered insolvent by the transfer.
Appellant Sittner is unable to allege any of the above.

He

has no standing to bring an action under any portion of this
statute.

He is not a creditor of any named defendant.

His

judgment and judgment lien were satisfied and extinguished in Bruce
GiIdea's bankruptcy.

Alleged debtor, Bruce Gildea made no

transfer of any of his assets and was not rendered insolvent by
Schriever's purchase of Halefs vendor's interest in the subject
installment land contract.

Appellee Schriever is a bona fide

purchaser who paid valuable consideration and acted in good faith,
without notice or knowledge of adverse claims and with no intent to
defraud.
Sittner asked the trial court to "impress" the subject realty
with a judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting first lien against
a one-half undivided interest in the subject property".
Sittnerfs

judgment

lien had

somehow

survived

Even if

Bruce GiIdea's

bankruptcy it could not supersede appellee Hale's interest in the
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property.

A vendor's secured interest in an installment land

contract protects the vendor's property from appropriation by
creditors of the vendee*

If such were not the case installment

sales would not be a commercially viable alternative for selling
land.
Joy Hale's title to the subject property was in no way
impaired by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy.
creditor.

She was a secured

Her security was the title to the property.

The Gildea's owed Ms. Hale much more than the property was
worth.

The contract was seriously in default and amortizing

negatively.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy found it to be of no value

to Mr. Gildea's bankruptcy estate.

Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen

issued an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to appellee Joy
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property leaving her free to dispose
of her interest in the property as she pleased. [Rec. 1113].
Although free of the Automatic Stay in February of 1988,
Sittner brought no adversary proceeding seeking to value the
subject real estate contract or assert a judgement lien interest in
the property while the Gildea bankruptcy was before the Bankruptcy
Court.
B.

An Action For Declaratory Relief Should Be
Brought As A Separate Action.

Appellant contends that he should not be liable for attorneys
fees for litigating an action which the trial court found to be
without merit and brought in bad faith simply because he asserts
the action is "commenced" under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act,
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Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1.

This defense is indicative of the bad

faith exhibited throughout this litigation.
The complaint alleges the conveyance from Hale to Schriever
"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the "Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-6-1 et seq."
and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued "with
actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien claimed
by appellant Sittner.

Sittner asked the trial court to "impress"

the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting
first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the subject
property" and to have the subject property sold at execution sale
to satisfy Sittner!s Judgment." [Complaint, Rec. 6,7,8]
By affidavit, Sittner asserted the

"judgment lien" had an

"unpaid balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate
of 20% per annum.

[Sittner Affidavit, Rec. 130-134].

Nowhere in

the pleadings did Sittner acknowledge that his judgment had been
fully discharged in Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy action.
Sittner sued Hale and Schriever even though he had never been
a creditor of either.

Mabey

filed

a lis pendens against

Schrieverfs property and filed two motions for Summary Judgment
asking the court to allow execution and sale of the property all
without a final determination that Sittner had a valid lien against
the property and that there had been a fraudulent transfer by
debtor Gildea.
An action for declaratory judgment should be a separate action
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from an effort to impress a lien and foreclose and sell a property.
Baldwin v. Burton 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) holds that before
any relief is available under the Fraudulent Transfer Act there
must first be a separate action to determine if there has been a
fraudulent transfer.

The remedy provided by the Fraudulent

Transfer Act is the voiding of the conveyance.
Of particular relevance to this litigation is the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Baldwin that:
Had the Burtons proceeded with an honest belief in the
propriety of their activities they would have sought
first to have the Wood to Wood conveyance set aside as
fraudulent before attempting to wrongfully execute on
Baldwin's interest in the property.
Accordingly, we
hold that Baldwin is entitled to an award of attorney
fees under section 78-27-56.
Point III. APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES FOR DEFENDING
A FRIVOLOUS LAW SUIT AND A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
A.

Appellant's Action Is Without Merit And In Bad Faith.

The problem of frivolous lawsuits is plaguing our legal
system. In 1988 the Utah legislature amended section U.C.A. 78-2756. The amendment makes the award of attorney's fee mandatory when
a frivolous action is initiated.

The legislature promulgated the

Amendment with the hope that the courts will award attorney's fees
more aggressively so that practitioners will refrain from filing
actions which are frivolous.
Baldwin v. Burton 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) provides a
recent interpretation of the amended statute.

The Court stated:

For a party to be entitled to attorney fees under section
78-27-56, the trial court must determine that a claim is
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"without merit" and that the party's conduct in bringing the suit
was "lacking in good faith." In Cady, we defined both of these
elements, stating that "without merit" means "frivolous" or "having
no basis in law or fact." For purposes of section 78-27-56, we
found the terms "lack of good faith" and "bad faith" to be
synonymous. To establish bad faith, one or more of the following
must be lacking: "(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact
that the activities in question will [sic] hinder, delay or defraud
others."
Judge Wilkinson entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law detailing the basis for his award of attorney fees. [Rec. 12501255, Addendum 2].

He concluded that "Plaintiff's claims are

without merit and not asserted in good faith."

To establish both

lack of merit and bad faith, Judge Wilkinson's Conclusions of Law
state:
1. Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce
GiIdea's estate was waived during the course of Bruce
GiIdea's bankruptcy. Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance
of the judgment lien in order to participate in the
distribution to unsecured creditors.
2.
Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant
and has no basis in law to contest any transfer of
property by any of them. Plaintiff had no grounds for
suing defendants Hale and Schriever for fraudulent
transfer of property.
Judge

Wilkinson's

conclusions

are

supported

by

sixteen

specific Findings of Fact.
Appellant protests the trial court's entry of Summary Judgment
claiming there are issues of material fact which are unresolved but
his Brief does not say what they are.

This court should bear in

mind that Appellant on two different occasions filed his own
motions for summary judgement in effect alleging there are no
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issues of material fact.

Appellant failed to raise any relevant

factual issues during the trial court's consideration of the crossmotions

for

summary

judgment.

All matters

in dispute were

questions of law.
Appellant filed no motion pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b),
52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contesting the
trial court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in

support of its award of attorney fees.
B.

Appellees Should Be Awarded Just Damages For Frivolous
Appeal.

Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for an
award of just damages for frivolous appeal and delay including
single or double costs and

reasonable attorney

fees against

Appellant and/or Appellant's attorney, L. Benson Mabey.
An appeal brought from an action that was properly determined
to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under Rule 33(a). Utah
Dep't of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Attorney Mabey has played fast and loose with pleadings
throughout this case. He continues to misrepresent this action as
brought under the "Utah Declaratory Judgments Act" when in fact he
sued appellees under the Utah Fraudulent Transfers Act requesting
foreclosure and sale of the subject property.
Mabeyfs penchant for misrepresentation and distortion of fact
and law is clearly manifested in the Brief filed with this court.

His mischaracterization of facts and law include; (1) a refusal to
acknowledge that Gildea's debt was fully discharged in bankruptcy,
(2) a refusal to admit that the bankruptcy automatic stay relating
to the subject property was in effect for no more than two years
and thirty three days, not six years as he alleges and (3) a
refusal to acknowledge that the life of judgment liens is governed
by state law not federal law.
Mr. Mabeyfs ego is clearly bruised.

He simply cannot accept

the fact that he is not as clever as he fashions himself.

His

effort to outsmart, (1) the bankruptcy court; (2) the trial court;
(3) the Supreme Court, and now the Court of Appeals is the root of
his problems.
This appeal was filed for purposes of delay and not filed
pursuant to a good faith belief in the merits of the appeal. Both
Appellant Sittner and Attorney Mabey should

be ordered to re-

imburse appellees for the cost of exposing the charade surrounding
this frivolous litigation.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's
complaint and its Supplemental Judgment awarding appellees attorney
fees

pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

78-27-56 should be affirmed.

This Court should award Appellees attorneys fees and costs on
appeal pursuant Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
remand the case for the limited purpose of determining those
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amounts.
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Addendum 1

Grant W. P. Morrison 3666
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774

FUD DISTRICT COURT
^ r d Judicial District

MAR 2 5 1997
' SAH; LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459cv

Defendants.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The
1

court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the
record the basis for its opinion, and having entered its FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and good cause appearing, NOW
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES:
1. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein
is hereby dismissed on its merits and with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein
is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. Defendants are herewith awarded their costs and reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The amounts of
attorney fees is preserved for later determination by this Court
and are to be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to
include any

fees

incurred

in other actions before the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court or U.S. District Court.
DATED this

s^ ^

day of ^

^^>^*0

1997.

BY THE COURT:

/ Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
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Addendum 2

Grant W. P. Morrison 3666
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774

FiLf D DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial Disiric'

MAR 2 5 1997
-SfhT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT

^

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459cv

Defendants.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The

court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the
record the basis for its opinion, and good cause appearing, DOES
HEREBY MAKE AND ENTER THE FOLLOWING:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about February 20, 1981, Defendant Joy Hale, as

seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants
Bruce Gildea and shirlynn Gildea, as buyers. Under the terms of the
contract Ms. Hale agreed to sell and the Gildeas agreed to buy a
house and lot located in Salt Lake County at 2400 East 3000 South.
2.

On November 25, 1985, Plaintiff John C. Sittner obtained

judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea and others in the amount of
$30,598.35 together with an award of costs, attorney's fees of
$3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per annum.
3.

In

January

of

1986

Defendant

Bruce

Gildea, filed

banlcruptcy proceedings in the Untied States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah.
4.

Plaintiff Sittner and his attorney L. Benson Mabey filed

a claim with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured
creditors based upon Sittner's judgment.
5. During the course of Defendant Bruce Gildeafs bankruptcy,
Bankruptcy

Trustee,

Duane

H.

Gillman,

filed

an

Adversarial

Complaint, under Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid
the judgment lien asserted by Plaintiff Sittner alleging the same
2

constituted a preferential transfer in violation of the Bankruptcy
Code. Plaintiff through his attorney L. Benson Mabey thereupon
entered into a stipulation with Trustee Gillman agreeing to the
following terms:
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives
any right to assert a secured claim in and to
any property of this estate or any funds which
constitute proceeds of property of this estate
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has
is
an
unsecured,
pre-petition
claim.
Defendants
rights
respecting
property
abandoned by the estate or not administered by
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby."
6.

Plaintiff John C. Sittner thereupon secured payment of

$4,302.99 from Trustee Gillman as Sittner's share of distribution
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73.
7. On December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order discharging Defendant Bruce
Gildea from all personal

liability under Plaintiff

Sittner#s

judgment.
8. On February 19, 1988 Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property.
9.

In January of 1992, Defendant Joy Hale sold her interest

in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to Defendant karen H.
Schriever for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for
cash.
10.

On August 3, 1992 Defendant Hale Conveyed and Warranted

clear title to the property to Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of the
Karen H. Schriever Family Trust, dated July 20, 1992. Upon purchase

3

of

the

vendor's

interest

in the

subject

property

Defendant

Schriever assumed Mrs, Hale's position as contract seller to the
Gildeas.
11.

On June 28, 1993 Plaintiff Sittner brought action to

impress the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and
subsisting first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the
subject property", asserting said judgment lien had an "unpaid
balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate of 20%
per annum.
12.

In a companion cause of action Plaintiff Sittner alleged

that Defendant Schriever's purchase, from Defendant Hale, of the
vendor

interest

in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract

"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 25-6-1 et
seq" and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued
"with actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien
claimed by Plaintiff Sittner.
13.

There has been no conveyance of any sort by Defendant

Bruce Gildea, of his one half interest in the subject property. The
Gildeas retain a vendee's interest under the installment purchase
contract and continue to occupy the subject property as their
family residence.
14.

Defendant Bruce Gildea is not insolvent and he has no

indebtedness to Plaintiff John C. Sittner.
15.

Plaintiff Sittner's judgment was entered November 25,

1985. Enforcement of the judgment has at no time been stayed by/on
4

appeal and no action to renew the judgment has been undertaken.
16.

The eight (8) year statutory period for foreclosing

Plaintiff's judgment lien has expired, notwithstanding any tolling
periods that could have been caused by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his

judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce Gildea's
estate was waived during the course of Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy.
Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance of the judgment lien in order
to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors.
2. Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant and has
no basis in law to contest any transfer of property by any of them.
Plaintiff had no grounds for suing defendants Hale and Schriever
for fraudulent transfer of property.
3.

Had

the claimed

judgment

lien survived the Gildea

bankruptcy, enforcement of the lien would have been barred by the
statute of limitations for foreclosing judgment liens.
4.

Plaintiff's claims are without merit and not asserted in

good faith.
5.

There

are no genuine

issues of material

fact and

defendants are entitled to-judgment as a matter of law.
6.

Defendant Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary

Judgment should be, and is hereby, granted. Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and is hereby, denied. All
other motions pending before the court, including motions to take
5

depositions and compel further discovery, are rendered moot.
7.

Judgment should be granted against Plaintiff dismissing

this action with prejudice and awarding all defendants reasonable
attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action as provided
under Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56, as amended. Attorney's fees are to
be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to include any
fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court or
U.S. District Court.
DATED this ^ ^>

day of ^ ? <^^^A

1997.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
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Addendum 3

COPY
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:
BRUCE GILDEA,

)
) 86A-20168
)

Debtor.

) Court's Ruling

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN H. ALLEN
May 12, 1995

Alpha Court Reporting Service
P.O. Box 510047
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0047
Telephone (801)532-5645
Fax No. (801)595-8910
Reported By: Karen Murakami, CSR, RPR
File No. 512-95K

1

Salt Lake City, Utah, Friday, May 12, 1995, 9:00 a.m.

2

3

* * •

THE COURT:

There is no question in my mind but

4

what the law is that generally in a bankruptcy case a lien

5

survives the bankruptcy case if there has been no action in

6

the case contrary to that.

7

claimant files a secured claim in a bankruptcy case, the

8

claimant is telling the creditors and the court and the

9

debtor that the claimant intends to rely upon that security

10

and will not participate in any dividends that are developed

11

for unsecured creditors.

12

files an unsecured claim, the claimant is telling the

13

creditors and the court and the debtor that the claimant

14

claims nothing, and if that claimant has a lien the claimant

15

is waiving that lien and intends to pursue that claimant's

16

pro rata share of dividends collected for unsecured

17

creditors.

18

I believe also that when a

By the same token when a claimant

In this case, the Court finds that the claimant,

19

John C. Sittner, did file a proof of claim in the amount of

20

$36,228.73 and the claim designated that claim as an

21

unsecured claim.

22

judgment.

23

of the claim, and that is consistent with the testimony of

24

Mr. Mabey here today, that he felt there was no equity in the

25

property at the time and there would be nothing gained from

The claim did recite that it was based on a

But I think that fact alone is evidence of waiver

1

pursuing the secured claim.

2

evidence there would be and I think I could find or would

3

find that the secured claim or the lien is waived based upon

4

the proof of claim only.

5

Normally that would be all the

In this case, there are other documents and other

6

circumstances.

The stipulation entered into between Mr.

7

Sittner and the Bankruptcy Trustee recites that, among other

8

things, it acknowledges that any and all claim he has, he

9

Sittner, is an unsecured prepetition claim.

In addition to

10

that, Mr. Sittner participated and received dividends as an

11

unsecured creditor, thus depriving other creditors of a

12

larger distribution, if there were some equity to be claimed

13

in the secured claim.

14

Thus, my conclusion is that the actions of Mr.

15

Sittner in this case in filing the proof of claim as an

16

unsecured claim, participating in all respects as an

17

unsecured creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured

18

creditor with a prepetition claim had the effect of waiving

19

that judgment lien.

20

any order of this Court, but I think the conclusion is that

21

it was waived is proper.

22

The judgment lien wasn't set aside by

The next thing I have to find is whether there has

23

I been a violation of the injunction, that's the discharge

24

| injunction.

25

| That discharge enjoined all creditors and other parties from

The discharge was entered on December 14, 19 87

attempting to collect any debt that has been discharged.
2

The

I unsecured debt represented by the proof of claim was

3

discharged.

4

state court to set aside a conveyance to other parties and to

5

foreclose the lien that had been waived is an action in

6

violation of the discharge injunction.

7

There was no basis whatsoever for filing the suit in the

8

state court.

9

And the action of bringing an action in the

There was no lien.

I find, therefore, that Mr. Sittner waived the

10

lien.

11

suing in the state court was a violation of the injunction.

12

Sanctions are appropriate against both Mr. Sittner and

13

counsel Mr. Mabey, who participated in all respects in the

14

bankruptcy proceeding and had all the knowledge, in fact more

15

knowledge probably than Mr. Sittner.

16

There was no lien after the discharge.

The action of

The question I have is whether this was a willful

17

violation justifying anything other than actual damages. Mr.

18

Sittner didn't testify, so the Court has no way of knowing

19

what he knew and why the case was filed or anything about his

20

financial ability to respond to sanctions.

And I can't tell

21

from Mr. Mabey1s testimony whether there was or was not any

22

knowledge that this was, in fact, a violation of the

23

discharge injunction.

24

My observations too are that the debtor could have

25

come to this Court to receive a determination of a violation

1

of this injunction far earlier than he did.

2

lot of litigation in the state court, and I'm not faulting

3

the state court for that, but to get a determination of the

4

violation of a discharge injunction, this is the Court that

5

must make that determination.

6
7
2

There's been a

And so my conclusion is that perhaps all of those
attorney's fees would not have been spent had the parties
! come to this

Court before-

But en the ether hand, creditors

9

and counsel should be encouraged to avoid violation of the

10

discharge injunction, violation of their own position taken

11

in the bankruptcy court and that position is that they're

12

unsecured.

13

I believe, therefore, that the violations were

14

willful, not malicious but willful in the sense that they

15

were knowing, knowing that the discharge injunction was there

16

and knowing or should have known knowing that the law

17

prohibited these actions.

18

With all that in mind, I don't think that sanctions

19

justify $25,000.

I think the only thing that is justified

20

under the circumstances is reimbursement of the attorney's

21

fees, which I'm going to fix in the amount of $8,000.

22

those are the sanctions that will be awarded against Mr.

23

Sittner and Mr. Mabey, and that's the extent.

So

24

Mr. Morrison, would you prepare an order.

You need

25

not make all of the findings of fact and conclusions of law,

1

since they have been made on the record, but you can prepare

2

the order concerning the sanctions.

3

MR. MORRISON:

4

Point of clarification, that was a

total of $8,000.

5

THE COURT: Total.

6

MR. MORRISON:

7

THE COURT:

8

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you, Your Honor.

If there are no questions then, Court

will be in recess.

9

10

I've got it.

(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)

1

* **

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
4

| COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

5
6

1

I, Karen Murakami, a Certified Shorthand Reporter

7

and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby

8

certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings was

9

taken before me at the time and place set forth herein and

10

was taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed

11

into typewriting under my direction and supervision;

12

That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct

13

transcription of my said shorthand notes so taken.

14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
seal this

15

M?

day of

Y W C ^ >

, 1995.

16
17

h:

18
19

J

KAREN MURAKAMI, CSR, RPR

20
21

I My commission expires:

22

I January 14, 1997

23
24
25

-trftfc

Addendum 4

J

Bt W. P. Morris
#3666
Drney at Law
5 East 3300 South
$blt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-7999.
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

JL'H 8 K 03 Pi'i '35

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
\V;L

IN RE:

Bankruptcy No. 86A-00168
(Chapter 7)

BRUCE L. GILDEA,

ORDER

Debtor.

Judge: John H, Allen

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on debtor's Motion
for Sanctions for Violating Bankruptcy Discharge and for Finding
that Claim of John C. Sittner was Unsecured and Discharged and for
Attorney's Fees, on the 12th day of May, 1995, and Grant W, P.
Morrison appearing for debtor and L. Benson Mabey appearing for
John C. Sittner, and testimony having been taken and
exhibits admitted, and argument have been heard, and the Court
having read Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law into the
record,

the Court,

for good

cause appearing,

hereby ORDERS,

ADJUDGES AND DECREES,
1.

The actions of John C, Sittner in this case in filing the

proof of claim as an unsecured claim, participating in all respects
as an unsecured creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured
creditor with a prepetition claim had the effect of waiving the

pigment lien agai

the property of debtor

ted at 2400 East

/000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, and it is so ordered.
2.

Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy was discharged December 14,

1987, and that discharge enjoined all creditors and other parties
from attempting to collect any debt that has been discharged. The
action of John C. Sittner of suing in state court was a violation
of the injunction, which is still in effect, and sanctions are
appropriate against both John C. Sittner and his counsel L. Benson
Mabey, for violation of the continuing injunction, in the amount of
Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), jointly and severally.
DATED this

/,^day of

^<^<:— , 1995.
BY THE COURT:

s,//

^,9^

John H. Allen
U. S. Bankruptcy Judge

^ i r r ^ e n s o n Mabey
Attorney for
John c. Sittner

, r ^ - b y certity that the annexed and ior$got%
is a true and compete copy of a document on
file in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah.
Dated: \ ) | | i * |
Attest:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRJ^T

OTOTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Appellant,

ORDER

vs.
Civil No. 2:<

BRUCE L. GILDEA,
Appellee.

This case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's order dated June 14, 1995, which found
that appellant Sinner's judgment lien on property owned by the debtor, appellee Gildea, was
waived by Sittner in the course of Gildea's bankruptcy proceeding, and that Gildea's discharge
order on December 14, 1987, enjoined all creditors, including Sittner, from suing to recover debts
which had been discharged. The bankruptcy court found that Sittner and his counsel L. Benson
Mabey had violated the discharge injunction by filing an action in state court on the judgment lien
which had been waived. The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions of $8,000.00 as
"reimbursement of the attorney's fees" against Sittner and Mabey.
The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation of the status of Sittner's judgment
lien is correct in all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was waived in the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings, and that the debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in bankruptcy.

(^

However, the issue of the dischargeability of this debt was properly presented to the state
tcum first, and the state court had jurisdiction to rule on this issue. In the state court action,
Gildea raised the bankruptcy discharge as a defense, and the state court found that the lien had
survived Gildea's bankruptcy and the debt was not subject to the discharge order. It was only
after the state court had made this adverse ruling1 that Gildea went to the bankruptcy court to
seek another ruling on the same issue. The issue of whether a debt has been discharged in
bankruptcy can be decided either in state court or bankruptcy court, both courts having
concurrent jurisdiction over such issues. See In re Carter. 156 B.R. 768 (E. D. Va. 1993); In re
Brice. 79 B.R. 310 (S. D. Ohio 1987). The state court was therefore competent to make a ruling
on the dischargeability issue, and the state court's ruling stands unless reconsidered or overturned
on appeal. As in In re Coppi. 75 B.R. 81, 82 (S.D. Iowa 1987), appellee is simply attempting to
"relitigate the issue of dischargeability and effectively overturn the state court ruling in a
bankruptcy forum." Such grounds are insufficient to justify reopening the bankruptcy case, and
the reopening of this case was an abuse of discretion. Although in this case the state court is
apparently willing to follow the bankruptcy court's lead in deciding the dischargeability issue,2 the
issue has been properly presented to that court, and it is improper for the federal court to make a
ruling on an issue which has been fully litigated in state court.

1

The state court originally ruled in favor of Gildea on the dischargeability issue, deciding
that the lien had not survived the bankruptcy action and that Sittner's action should be dismissed.
Sittner requested that the court reconsider its ruling, and the court then ruled that the lien was
valid, and entered judgment for Sittner.
2

Following the bankruptcy court's order finding that the debt was discharged, the state
court reconsidered its ruling again, and on August 15, 1995, entered an order dismissing Sittner's
claim based on the bankruptcy court's findings.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's order reopening this case and imposing sanctions3 is
hereby reversed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

|lp day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

-* t ^

/S^A

TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge

3

Although this court does not disagree with the bankruptcy court's finding that appellant's
violation of the discharge order was "willful," an award of attorney fees, such as the bankruptcy
court made in this case, is available as a sanction in the state court proceeding. The court notes
that, in fact, the state court's August 15, 1995 order awards appellee attorney fees.

